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Resolving the Paradox of the Innocent
Construction Rule
DAVID A. LARSON*
The application of the innocent construction rule in defamation
cases has led to illogical and questionable holdings. This article
will explain the nature of that rule and illustrate its use by
focusing on cases arising in Illinois. It will review the recent case
of Chapski v. Copley Press,1 where the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected the innocent construction rule, and raise the possibility
that additional reform may be necessary in Illinois. Finally, other
jurisdictions relying upon similar rules of interpretation will be
identified and discussed.
The Innocent Construction Rule
The innocent construction rule is a rule of interpretation ap-
plied in defamation cases. It requires that allegedly libelous or
slanderous statements be rendered nonactionable if it is possible
to understand those statements in a harmless manner.2 "That
rule holds that the article is to be read as a whole and the words
given their natural and obvious meanings, and requires that
words allegedly libelous that are capable of being read innocently
must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law." 3
As will be noted later, the Illinois Supreme Court's preceding
description of the rule suggests something of a paradox. One may
ask how a statement can be given its natural and obvious meaning
when at the same time it must be innocently read whenever
possible. Although Illinois courts occasionally struggled with that
*David A. Larson is currently a member of the faculty at Millsaps College,
School of Management. He is a member of the Illinois, Minnesota, and American
Bar Associations and practiced with the Minneapolis, Minnesota law firm of
Meagher, Geer, Markham, Anderson, Adamson, Flaskamp and Brennan. He is
a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of DePauw University and graduated from the
University of Illinois College of Law.
1. 92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982).
2. John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 443-44, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108 (1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
3. Id. at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
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inconsistency, the rule evolved so that statements came to be
read in the latter sense, as nondefamatory whenever possible.
The impact of such a rule is obvious. By the careful use of
terms with multiple meanings a speaker can aggressively attack
a given target and, when subsequently challenged, that speaker
can rely upon the ambiguities to construct a much less offensive
meaning.
John v. Tribune Co.
While Illinois state courts and federal courts applying Illinois
law had utilized the rule previously,4 the Illinois Supreme Court
clearly embraced the innocent construction rule in 1962.5
Facts
The police arrested the female owner of an apartment building
as well as several of her companions on charges of prostitution.
Learning of the arrests, the Chicago Tribune newspaper printed
a story declaring that Dorothy Clark had been arrested for being
a "keeper of a disorderly house and selling liquor without a
license." 6 Dorothy Clark was identified additionally as using the
names Dolores Reising, Eve Spiro and Eve John.7 A woman who
had no connection with the alleged activities lived in the base-
ment of the building. Her maiden name had been Eve Spiro and
her current name was Eve John. As one might anticipate, Eve
John initiated a libel action shortly thereafter.
4. E.g., Crosby v. Time, Inc., 254 F.2d 927, 929-30 (7th Cir. 1958); Latimer
v. Chicago Daily News, 330 Ill. App. 295, 71 N.E.2d 553 (1947); Michael J. Polelle
argues that the adoption of the innocent construction rule in Illinois was a
historical accident and a clear error. He maintains that the appellate court
cases cited by the Illinois Supreme Court in John v. Tribune Co. did not rest
upon nearly so broad a rule as that adopted by the Supreme Court. Rather, he
suggests that there was some confusion as to the issues before the court in
John. Consequently, the inherent shortcomings as well as some well-reasoned
precedent supporting rejection of the rule were not adequately presented to
the court. As a result, it was an uninformed court that chose to adopt the
innocent construction rule. Polelle, The Guilt of the "Innocent Construction Rule"
in Illinois Defamation Law, 1 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 181, 195-211 (1981).
5. John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105 (1962).
6. Id. at 440, 181 N.E.2d at 106.
7. Id. at 439-40, 181 N.E.2d at 106.
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Decision
The court focused on the exact language used by the Tribune
Company and pointed out that the suspect had been identified
as Dorothy Clark, also known as Dorothy Reising, "alias Eve
Spiro and Eve John." The court determined that the word "alias"
implies that the proper name of an individual is the name pre-
ceding,9 and reasoned:
words allegedly libelous that are capable of being read inno-
cently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter
of law [cites omitted]. Since both of the publications here are
capable of being construed as referring only to Dorothy Clark-
Dorothy Reising as the keeper of the disorderly house, they
are innocent publications as to the plaintiff.10
John v. Tribune Co., created an extremely liberal rule in favor
of defamation defendants. It mandated that statements must be
given an innocent construction whenever possible. Additionally,
it established that one should not only attempt to determine
whether the meaning of the words could be viewed in an accept-
able light but also whether the statement could possibly be
considered as addressing someone other than the plaintiff. In
other words, the innocent construction rule was also to be applied
to the issue of colloquium.
Application in Illinois
The innocent construction rule creates a threshold concern. A
preliminary question is raised as to whether a particular state-
ment can be innocently construed. The question is to be answered
by the court as a matter of law.1 Given the scope of the rule,
Illinois courts predictably have issued opinions that on one level
are rather amusing but on a second more serious level are quite
disturbing. The following cases serve as illustrations:
Robert Heilgeist, a Wisconsin attorney, owned land in Illinois.
The County Zoning Board contacted Heilgeist and received per-
8. Id. at 439, 181 N.E.2d at 106.
9. Id. at 441-43, 181 N.E.2d at 107-08.
10. Id. at 442-43, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
11. Valentine v. North American Co., 60 Ill. 2d 168, 171, 328 N.E.2d 265,
267 (1974); Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 Ill. 2d 345, 347, 243 N.E.2d
217, 220 (1968).
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mission to go onto the land and remove all the rubbish. The
Board, however, did not intend to collect a fee from Heilgeist for
performing the work.
A local publication reported on the arrangement and inquired
as to the reason the Board did not plan to pursue recovery. It
then printed the response that, while it was rather unusual that
the county would spend public funds to clean up land and not
try to collect those costs, "Heilgeist has so many lawsuits against
him now that it would be more trouble trying to collect than it's
worth."
1 2
Heilgeist v. Lakeland Publishers, Inc.'3 arose out of Heilgeist's
claim that the statement implied legal malpractice suits were
pending against him, suggested he was judgment proof, and
injured him in his professional standing. The federal court which
heard the case disagreed and declared that this statement merely
indicated that Heilgeist was not going to have to pay for the
work and, "[q]uite the contrary of plaintiffs claim that he appears
in a derogatory light, such a comment can be construed to indicate
he is a shrewd bargainer.
'1 4
Benjamin Rasky was also a property owner in Illinois. Rasky
was involved in defending charges that, if proven, would have
led to the revocation of his real estate license. His reaction to
the news report regarding his circumstances developed into Rasky
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.15 Rasky particularly ob-
jected to the repeated charge that he was a "slumlord."1 6 The
appellate court pursued a matter-of-fact analysis:
Black's Law Dictionary defines a "landlord" as one who,
"being the owner of an estate in land, or rental property, has
leased it to another person ***." (BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
790 (5th ed. 1979).) It defines "slum" as a "squalid, rundown
section of a city, town or village, ordinarily inhabited by the
very poor and destitute classes ***." (BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1245 (5th ed. 1979).) Based on these definitions
and applying the innocent construction rule, the terms "slum
landlord" and "slumlord" can be construed to mean that the
plaintiff owned buildings in a poor and dirty neighborhood
or, simply stated, that the plaintiff was a landlord in a slum.
7
12. Heilgeist v. Lakeland Publishers, Inc., No. 78 C 274, slip op. at
(N.D. Ill. July 10, 1978).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 103 Ill. App. 3d 577, 431 N.E.2d 1055 (1981).
16. Id. at 579-81, 431 N.E.2d at 1057-58.
17. Id. at 581-82, 431 N.E.2d at 1058.
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Determining that there was nothing wrong with merely owning
property in a run-down neighborhood, the court ignored the
obvious intent of the defendant's charge and dismissed the law-
suit. Illinois courts found it necessary to rely upon this form of
simplistic literal analysis in order to apply the innocent construc-
tion rule.
In Delis v. Sepsis,18 George Delis was the target of an emotional
letter alleging that, as to the activities surrounding the placement
of statuary in a public square, Delis had acted in a manner that
was "dishonorable," "deluded," and that he was a "liar." 19 The
appellate court rejected plaintiffs complaint stating that the
negative impact of these statements would be strictly limited to
the context of the placement of the statuary and would not affect
the plaintiff generally. The court stated:
In the case at bar, the words "liar," "dishonorable," and the
other allegedly disparaging remarks used by defendant in his
letter of November 23, 1970, are capable of being read inno-
cently. They did not imply that the plaintiff was generally a
dishonest person or one who could not be believed under
oath. It would not seem reasonable to conclude that the words
complained of posed any serious threat to plaintiffs reputa-
tion.2
0
Finally, the extent to which Illinois courts have reached to
find an innocent construction is reflected in Watson v. Southwest
Messenger Press, Inc.21 Mayor Thomas Watson was alleged by a
local paper to have ordered a "ticket writing spree." 22 However,
the article stated, none of the tickets were paid because the
Mayor visited the recipients afid promised to void the tickets.
The paper reported that several persons stated that, "Mayor
Watson will fix them " 23 and that residents were protesting the
"Watson game of Winning Votes." 24 Plaintiff Watson alleged that
he had brought the matter of parking tickets before the city
council and the council had agreed that the first tickets should
be considered merely warnings. He stated that he had ordered
the ticket writing to continue and that after a lapse of time the
tickets would be considered valid. Among the several independent
18. 9 Ill. App. 3d 217, 292 N.E.2d 138 (1972).
19. Id. at 220, 292 N.E.2d at 141.
20. Id. at 221-22, 292 N.E.2d at 142.
21. 12 Ill. App. 3d 968, 299 N.E.2d 409 (1973).
22. Id. at 970, 299 N.E.2d at 411.
23. Id. at 971, 299 N.E.2d at 411.
24. Id.
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reasons provided as a basis for affirming the summary judgment
granted in favor of the defendant was the following:
The first of these articles speaks about "a ticket scandal of
sorts"; speaks about the alleged promise of plaintiff to "void"
the tickets and then uses the word "fix" with reference to
the traffic tickets. As defendants urge, the word "fix" has
many dictionary meanings. It could mean the process of
repairing, mending or putting in order....25
Because an innocent construction was possible, the Illinois
appellate court affirmed the judgment awarded the defendant.
Yet it taxes the imagination to suggest that the newspaper was
actually reporting that Mayor Watson was repairing his dis-
traught constituents' torn parking tickets. While the preceding
examples are certainly not exhaustive, they do indicate the nature
of the opinions that were being issued.
Illinois courts recognized the strained nature of their holdings
and the rule created a good deal of confusion. Alternative grounds
were utilized whenever possible. In American Pet Motels, Inc. v.
Chicago Veterinary Medical Association26 the defendant asserted
that the plaintiffs claim was barred by the innocent construction
rule. The plaintiff responded that the rule did not apply to libel
per quod actions. The appellate court could not identify any cases
focusing upon that issue. While some Illinois state and federal
court decisions indirectly supported the plaintiffs position, the
American Pet Motels, Inc. court stated:
This view, however, is difficult to reconcile with the sweeping
language used by the Supreme Court to usher in the innocent
construction rule.... The rule says "nonactionable as a matter
of law," not "nonactionable without proof of special damages."
We also note that some Illinois opinions discuss the innocent
construction rule as it applies to libel per quod (citations
omitted). We conclude the law is unsettled.... We therefore
elect to decide the instant appeal on an alternate ground.27
The Chapski Decision
Recently the Illinois Supreme Court chose to abandon the
innocent construction rule. In Chapski v. Copley Press28 the court
25. Id. at 973, 299 N.E.2d at 413.
26. 106 Ill. App. 3d 626, 435 N.E.2d 1297 (1982).
27. Id. at 630-31, 435 N.E.2d at 1301.
28. 92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982).
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instead adopted a rule of reasonable construction. The importance
of the case is apparent after a review of the precedent cited
above.
Facts
A series of thirteen newspaper articles were published on
eleven different dates. They purported to summarize the judicial
proceedings occurring prior to the death of a child-abuse victim.
Plaintiff represented the child's mother in juvenile and divorce
proceedings. During the trial a question was raised as to the
plaintiffs conduct. A panel of the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission conducted hearings and concluded there
was insufficient evidence to warrant any finding that the plaintiff
had engaged in conduct that tended to defeat the administration
of justice or to bring the courts and the legal profession into
disrepute. It further concluded that Chapski's actions had "ab-
solutely nothing to do with the child's death."'
Plaintiff alleged that his reputation and legal practice were
injured by the defendant's articles, particularly an article entitled
"Who's to blame? Many questions in baby's death. 30 Chapski
focused on the fact that his name appeared in that particular
article twenty times in bold black type.
Decision
The Illinois Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of
whether the innocent construction rule should be retained as a
controlling principle in Illinois defamation law. The court began
by reviewing the history of the rule, noting that it had been
applied in "something less than a uniform fashion." 31 It focused
upon the unresolved contradiction with in the rule by stating,
"[t]o construe a publication in an unreasonable manner in order
to give it an innocent interpretation is itself incompatible with
the rule's requirement that words be given their 'natural and
obvious meanings'.."
32
The court recalled that prior to Gertz v. Welch, Inc.3 and New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan3 4 there may have been a greater need
to protect defendants from the harshness of defamation law but
29. Id. at 346, 442 N.E.2d at 196.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 348, 442 N.E.2d at 197.
32. Id. at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
33. 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974).
34. 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964).
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that this need was now diminished. The court concluded that
"given the inconsistencies, inequities and confusion ' 35 caused by
the rule, the greater protections offered by Gertz and Welch, and
the recognition of various privileges in Illinois, a modification of
the innocent construction rule was appropriate.
Illinois courts are no longer forced to grasp at any conceivable
interpretation in order to find an expression nonactionable. Rather,
as stated in Chapski, they are now in a position to consider
statements in context and to give natural and obvious meanings
to words and their implications.
3 6
Additional Reform
While Chapski provides a desirable revision of Illinois law,
other reform may be necessary as a consequence of that decision.
Although Illinois utilized the innocent construction rule, several
protections ordinarily afforded defamation defendants have not
been adopted in Illinois. Illinois does not consider truth to be an
absolute defense in libel cases7.3 Rather, its state constitution
dictates that, "[iun trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the
truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends,
shall be a sufficient defense.
38
Additionally, Illinois has chosen to retain punitive damages in
defamation actions.39 Finally, subsequent to John v. Tribune Co.,
Illinois courts have recognized a constitutional guarantee against
publicity placing one in a false light before the public.40 This
constitutional protection provides an alternative approach for
defamation defendants.
Although the innocent construction rule was overly extreme,
one should not completely lose sight of the concerns that led to
its adoption:
The rule of innocent construction has the desirable benefits
of encouraging the robust discussion of daily affairs [citation],
as well as of reducing litigation. 'The law of libel does not
provide redress for every expression of opinion touching on
a person's capabilities or qualifications *** no matter how
much the complained of statement may injure the subject
35. Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198.
36. Id. at 352, 442 N.E. 2d at 199.
37. Polelle, supra note, at 216 n. 144.
38. ILL. CONST. art. I, S 4.
39. Polelle, supra note 4, at 216 n. 148.
40. Id. at 217 n. 150.
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person in his own conception.' [citation]. The innocent con-
struction rule also comports with constitutional concerns about
encouraging free expression.
41
If one presumes that by virtue of the provisions described above
Illinois had achieved a balance with the extreme position estab-
lished by John v. Tribune Co., it would now appear in light of
Chapski that the pendulum has swung too far in favor of defa-
mation plaintiffs. Illinois should reconsider such generally ac-
cepted positions as "truth is an absolute defense." Chapski
represents a significant and dramatic reversal in Illinois and
requires that defamation law in general be re-examined.
Other Jurisdictions Recognizing the
Innocent Construction Rule
A small minority of states still have case law indicating that
the innocent construction rule retains some vitality. In Becker v.
Toulmin42 the Ohio Supreme Court stated that when offending
language is capable of both innocent and libelous interpretations,
that language will not be actionable per se.43 Obviously, that
holding standing alone does not reach as far as the rule in John
v. Tribune Co. Additionally, the court in Becker relied upon the
California case of Peabody v. Barham44 as a basis for its conclusion.
Peabody was rejected by the California Supreme Court in 1959
in the case of MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co.45 It has been
argued that Becker would appear to be questionable authority.
46
Yet these facts did not prevent a federal court applying Ohio
law from relying upon the innocent construction rule. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit quoted from John v. Tribune Co.
and applied the rule in a somewhat modified sense while holding
for the defendant in England v. Automatic Canteen Co. of Amer-
ica.47 Whereas the rejection of Peabody had no apparent impact
in England, one cannot be certain as to whether the Chapski
decision will be viewed with great importance in Ohio.
41. Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 Ill. App. 3d 67, 7, 397 N.E.2d 41, 44
(1979).
42. 165 Ohio St. 549, 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956).
43. Id. at 557, 138 N.E.2d at 398.
44. 52 Cal. App. 2d 581, 126 P.2d 668 (1942).
45. 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959).
46. Comment, The Illinois Doctrine of Innocent Construction: A Minority of
One, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 524, 538 (1963).
47. 349 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1965).
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Walker v. Kansas City Star Co., 4 8 reveals the Missouri Supreme
Court taking the position that "...in considering whether a pub-
lication is libelous per se, words to be considered actionable
should be unequivocally so (citation), and should be construed in
their most innocent sense."4 9
Hoog v. Strauss50 was a more recent slander action citing
Walker which indicates the innocent construction rule still has
some effect in Missouri. The appellate court stated that while
the accusation of a crime may be slander per se and that such
accusation need not be direct, "if it is not direct, it must be the
only inference that could be reasonably drawn from the language
used."51
New Mexico recognized a less rigid version of the rule. Rela-
tively strong language was used in Monnin v. Wood.52 In Monnin,
the court held that, "the language must be susceptible of but a
single meaning, and a defamatory meaning must be the only one
of which the writing is susceptible." 53 A later decision of the
appellate court, however, appears to have adopted a more relaxed
standard. The court in Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune
Co.54 reviewed Monnin and several other precedents and con-
cluded, "[t]his is but another way of saying that, where a per se
slanderous character is sought to be impressed upon the claimed
defamatory words, they will not be given such meaning unless
this is their fair and obvious import. 5 5
If the plain and obvious meaning of a particular expression
was defamatory, although there was also a rather obscure non-
defamatory interpretation, it appears New Mexico would find the
expression defamatory.
Approximately the same time as John v. Tribune Co. was
decided, the Montana Supreme Court in Steffes v. Crawford 6 held
that statements would be actionable per se on the condition that
"the language used therein must be susceptible of but one mean-
ing and that an opprobrious one."57 The recent case of Wainman
48. 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966).
49. Id. at 51.
50. 567 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
51. Id. at 357.
52. 86 N.M. 460, 525 P.2d 387 (Ct. App. 1974).
53. Id. at 462, 525 P.2d at 389.
54. 98 N.M. 282, 648 P.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 394, 649
P.2d 462 (1982).
55. Id. at 288, 648 P.2d at 327, citing Dillard v. Shattuck, 36 N.M. 202, 11
P.2d 543 (1932).
56. 143 Mont. 43, 386 P.2d at 842 (1963).
57. Id. at 48, 386 P.2d at 844 citing Burr v. Winnett Times Publishing Co.,
80 Mont. 70, 258 P.2d 242 (1927).
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v. Bowler58 expressed a similar position in that "the language
must be susceptible of but one meaning to constitute libel per
se.
The Chapski decision identified Oklahoma as one of the states
continuing to rely upon the innocent construction rule °6 0 citing
Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Knight.61 Yet Tulsa Tribune is approximately
fifty years old and, although it did state that "a publication would
be actionable per se when it was susceptible of but one meaning,
and that an opprobrious one,"62 to the extent it has been cited
in later cases it has generally been used to support other points
of law.63 It certainly has not developed a body of precedent
comparable to John and it progeny.
Conclusion
Chapski v. Copley Press represents a significant change in
Illinois defamation law. The innocent construction rule led to
results that were strained and tenuous. It remains for Illinois to
re-examine the current balance between defamation plaintiffs and
defendants. While Illinois produced the greatest amount of recent
case law adhering to the rule, the doctrine still exists as authority
in a few jurisdictions. The jurisdictions that do continue to refer
to the rule, however, do so in a more limited manner. They
generally limit the application to per se cases and avoid the
uncertainty Illinois experienced as to whether the doctrine should
also be applied in per quod cases.
6 4
58. 176 Mont. 92, 576 P.2d 268 (1978).
59. Id. at 95, 576 P.2d at 270.
60. Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d at 349, 442 N.E.2d at 197.
61. 174 Okla. 359, 50 P.2d 350 (1935).
62. Id. at 362, 50 P.2d at 353 citing Lindley v. Delman, 166 Okla. 165, 26
P.2d 751 (1933).
63. See generally, Nichols v. Bristow Publishing Co., 330 P.2d 1044 (Okla.
1956); Baker v. Ellis, 292 P.2d 1037 (Okla. 1957).
64. But cf. England v. Automatic Canteen Company, 349 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.
1965) (where the court does not distinguish between per se and per quod
actions).
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